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The Bright Misplaced Line:
Persistent Vegetative State and
Withdrawal of Artificial
Sustenance
One of the most troublesome issues
with end-of-life decision making is the
withdrawal of tube feeding. With the
decision in Wisconsin in the Edna M.F.
case, the withholding of tube feeding
has become more problematical.
Ultimately, that decision rests on a
medical issue: whether the person was
in a persistent vegetative state. This
article examines some of the historic
case law on this issue, then reviews
some of the medical literature on the
effects of the withdrawal of tube feed-
ing, then reviews case law develop-
ments in other states, and finally artic-
ulates what would be a workable
approach to this difficult issue.
By James A. Jaeger
The litigation has to do, in final analysis, with her
life,-its continuance or cessation,-and the responsi-
bilities, rights and duties, with regard to any fateful
decision concerning it, of her family, her guardian, her
doctors, the hospital, the State through its law
enforcement authorities, and finally the courts of jus-
tice.'
ne of the most controversial issues
relating to end-of-life decision mak-
ing is the question of withdrawal of
what is generally referred to as "tube
feeding" or "non-orally-ingested
nutrition and hydration" or "artificial nutrition
and hydration." For example, Wisconsin's first
"Natural Death Act,"' which authorizes advance
directives regarding end-of-life care, did not permit
the withdrawal of tube feeding. It was not until
passage of the Durable Power of Attorney for
Health Care Act in 1990 that this option was
authorized in Wisconsin.' Then, in 1991, the
Natural Death Act was amended to allow with-
holding or withdrawing tube feeding.
For those individuals who, through lack of
knowledge or foresight, do not leave advance med-
ical directives, the situation has been further com-
plicated by the 1997 decision of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in In the Matter of the Guardian-
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ship and Protective Placement of Edna M.E,s
which severely limited the authority of a guardian
of the person of an incompetent individual to direct
the withholding or withdrawal of tube feeding.'
Because of this decision, persons who have not left
advance directives or otherwise clearly made their
wishes known during their lifetime may be subject-
ed to tube feeding and have their dying process
prolonged in situations where, given the opportu-
nity, they might have decided that this is not what
they would want.
In this article I will first examine some of the
historic case law on this issue, then review some of
the medical literature on the effects of the with-
drawal of tube feeding, then review some case law
developments in other states, and finally try to
articulate what I believe would be a more workable
approach to this difficult issue.'
Case Development
One of the seminal cases addressing this issue was
In re Quinlan.' This case involved a young New
Jersey woman, Karen Ann Quinlan, who at age 22
stopped breathing for two successive 15-minute
periods. As a result, she suffered brain damage and
entered a persistent vegetative state.' Because she
could not breathe without assistance, she was
placed on a respirator. When it became apparent
that she would not recover, and after much soul-
searching, her father, Joseph Quinlan, petitioned
for appointment as the guardian of her person with
the explicit authority to remove the respirator, with
the expectation that this would result in her death.
This request was opposed by her doctors, the hos-
pital, the county prosecutor, the State of New
Jersey, and the guardian ad litem. The trial court
appointed Mr. Quinlan as guardian of the estate
but declined to appoint him guardian of the person
and grant the relief he sought. He appealed and the
matter was certified by the New Jersey Supreme
Court.
After preliminarily finding that Ms. Quinlan
"can never be restored to cognitive or sapient life""o
and that the "character and general suitability of
Joseph Quinlan as guardian for his daughter, in
ordinary circumstances, could not be doubted,""
the court went on to consider the specific relief
requested by Mr. Quinlan in this case. Mr. Quinlan
advanced three arguments: (1) that the failure to
appoint him guardian interfered with his free exer-
cise of religion; (2) that keeping Karen on the res-
pirator was cruel and unusual punishment in viola-
tion of the Eighth Amendment; and (3) that failure
to grant the relief sought denied Karen and Joseph
their rights to privacy. 2 The court summarily
rejected the first two arguments but held that
Karen's right of privacy was violated by continuing
her on the respirator. 3
The New Jersey court balanced the interests of
the state in preserving human life and defending the
rights of physicians to exercise their best profes-
sional judgment against the right of privacy of the
individual, as developed by the U.S. Supreme
Court.14 In applying this balance, the New Jersey
court stated:
We think that the State's interest contra weakens and
the individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of
bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims.
Ultimately there comes a point at which the individ-
ual's rights overcome the State's interest. It is for that
reason that we believe Karen's choice, if she were com-
petent to make it, would be vindicated by the law."
The court went on to state that because the only
"practical way" for Karen Ann Quinlan to exercise
her right to privacy would be through the actions
of a guardian, the guardian should be appointed
and allowed to exercise the right.'6 The court con-
cluded its opinion by considering issues related to
standards of medical practice and possible criminal
liability for the physicians and determined that nei-
ther one was sufficient to dissuade the court from
its primary holding. Therefore the court appointed
Joseph as guardian and authorized him to discon-
tinue the respirator.'
While the Quinlan case set standards for the use
of respirators," issues related to tube feeding con-
tinued to be undecided. As discussed below,
because of societal norms regarding the provision
of food and liquids to ill and dying persons, this
issue remains much more controversial.
The U.S. Supreme Court was confronted with
the tube-feeding issue in 1990 in Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Dep't of Health." The Cruzan
case involved a young woman who was severely
injured in an automobile accident. As a result of
the accident, she suffered severe brain damage and
was in a persistent vegetative state, defined by the
U.S. Supreme Court as "a condition in which a per-
son exhibits motor reflexes but evinces no indica-
tions of significant cognitive function."o As distin-
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guished from Karen Ann Quinlan, Nancy Cruzan
was able to breathe without the aid of a respirator.
However, there came a point when she was no
longer able to orally ingest food or fluids and was
kept alive only by the use of a gastric tube. At this
point her parents requested that the tube feeding be
discontinued. Nancy's health care providers
declined to carry out this request without court
approval. The parents then applied to the Missouri
courts for authority to discontinue tube feeding.
The trial court held that Nancy had a "fundamen-
tal right" under the state and federal constitutions
to refuse or direct the withdrawal of "death pro-
longing procedures." The trial court further held
that certain statements she had made some years
before indicated that her desire would be to have
the tube feeding discontinued." On that basis the
trial court authorized the parents to withdraw the
tube feeding. The case was appealed to the
Missouri Supreme Court, which reversed in a
divided vote.
The Missouri Supreme Court held that there
was a common-law right to refuse treatment, but it
was unwilling to elevate that right to constitution-
al status. However, the court held that the state-
ments attributed to Nancy were not "clear and
convincing evidence" of her wishes and therefore
the state interest in the preservation of life took
precedence.22
The U.S. Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, upheld the Missouri Supreme
Court.23 The majority opinion first made an exten-
sive analysis of state cases on the common-law
requirement of informed consent to medical treat-
ment and the concomitant right to refuse such
treatment. It held that a right to refuse treatment
does exist that may be exercised on behalf of an
incompetent patient by his or her surrogate deci-
sion maker, such as a guardian or conservator.24
This finding was consistent with the position of
the Missouri Supreme Court. However, the next
issue raised by the Cruzans was whether the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
prohibited the state of Missouri from imposing the
"clear and convincing" evidence standard. In ana-
lyzing this argument the Court agreed that an indi-
vidual had a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment,
including the use of feeding tubes.2 ' However, the
Court held that in the case of incompetent persons
the state's right to ensure the preservation of life
allowed it to insist on "clear and convincing" evi-
dence of the wishes of the incompetent person,
even in the face of such a liberty interest. The Court
stated:
In our view, Missouri has permissibly sought to
advance these interests through the adoption of a
"clear and convincing" standard of proof to govern
such proceedings. The function of a standard of
proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process
Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to instruct
the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our
society thinks he should have in the correctness of
factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudica-
tion. . . . We think it self-evident that the interests at
stake in the instant proceedings are more substantial,
both on an individual and societal level, than those
involved in a run-of-the-mill civil dispute. But not
only does the standard of proof reflect the importance
of a particular adjudication, it also serves as "a soci-
etal judgment about how the risk of error should be
distributed between the litigants." Santosky, supra,
455 U.S. at 755; Addington, supra, at 423. The more
stringent the burden of proof a party must bear, the
more that party bears the risk of an erroneous deci-
sion. We believe that Missouri may permissibly place
an increased risk of an erroneous decision on those
seeking to terminate an incompetent individual's life-
sustaining treatment. An erroneous decision not to
terminate results in a maintenance of the status quo;
the possibility of subsequent developments such as
advancements in medical science, the discovery of
new evidence regarding the patient's intent, changes
in the law, or simply the unexpected death of the
patient despite the administration of life-sustaining
treatment, at least create the potential that a wrong
decision will eventually be corrected or its impact
mitigated. An erroneous decision to withdraw life-
sustaining treatment, however, is not susceptible of
correction.2
After Cruzan, an incompetent individual's right
to be free of unwanted medical treatment will
depend on the existence of either an "advanced
directive" such as a living will or power of attorney
for health care dealing with the question or some
other evidence of his or her intent that will satisfy
a particular state's evidentiary standards applicable
to this issue. Without such evidence, the state may





In Wisconsin, there are two critical cases relating to
end-of-life decision making by guardians: In re the
Guardianship of L. W 27 and In re the Guardianship
of Edna M.. 2 In these two cases, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court has attempted to set guidelines for
guardians making end-of-life decisions for incom-
petent wards. In my view, the end result of these
cases is flawed, especially Edna M.E, because they
too narrowly constrict the ability of guardians to
make appropriate decisions for their wards.
Initially we must recognize that competent indi-
viduals have the ability to engage in advance plan-
ning for end-of-life health care decision making,
especially as it relates to the withholding or with-
drawal of tube feeding. In both the Power of
Attorney for Health Care and the Declaration to
Physicians, an individual may elect to forgo or ter-
minate tube feeding.29 The families of individuals
who have the foresight to deal specifically with
these issues will have the authority to carry out
their wishes relating to end-of-life care. However,
for those persons who have not executed one of
these documents, the road is much more difficult.
The case of In re L. W involved a 79-year-old
chronically mentally ill, institutionalized individual
who, according to the court, "may never have been
competent."" In early 1989, he suffered from car-
diac arrest resulting in a determination by his
physicians that he was in a "chronic, persistent veg-
etative state."" The doctors proposed to the
guardian that all life-sustaining medical treatment,
including artificial nutrition and hydration (tube
feeding), be discontinued. The guardian applied to
the court for permission to terminate the life-sus-
taining medical treatment, including tube feeding.
The trial court granted the request and the
guardian ad litem appealed to the Supreme Court.
While the case was pending, L.W. died of natural
causes. Notwithstanding his death, the court chose
to resolve the case.
The court first addressed the issue of whether
"an incompetent individual such as L.W. has the
right to refuse unwanted medical treatment."" It
concluded that such a right emanated from the com-
mon-law right of informed consent, from the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
and from Article I, Section 1, of the Wisconsin
Constitution.34 In so doing, the court cited Cruzan
and the actions of the Wisconsin Legislature in
enacting Wisconsin Statutes Chapters 154 and 155.Y
The court then addressed what it considered an
issue of "first impression" in Wisconsin, namely
whether the right to refuse unwanted medical
treatment includes the right to refuse artificial
nutrition and hydration.16 The court stated:
We recognize, as other courts have, that the provision
of food and water to one incapable of oral self-nour-
ishment raises unique concerns. Unlike most medical
technological advances of a mechanistic nature, it is
difficult to view nourishment as anything but normal
and essential human care. It is difficult not to view the
withdrawal of artificial feeding as inducing death
through starvation and dehydration. . . . (footnote
omitted) There is however no compelling distinction
between artificial feeding and other forms of medical
treatment. As succinctly stated by the New Jersey
Supreme Court:
Once one enters the realm of complex, high-
technology medical care, it is hard to shed the
"emotional symbolism" of food. Howeve,
artificial feedings such as nasogastric tubes,
gastrostomies, and intravenous infusions are
significantly different from bottle-feeding or
spoonfeeding-they are medical procedures
with inherent risks and possible side effects,
instituted by skilled health-care providers to
compensate for impaired physical function-
ing. Analytically, artificial feeding by means of
a nasogastric tube or intravenous infusion can
be seen as equivalent to artificial breathing by
means of a respirator. Both prolong life
through mechanical means when the body is
no longer able to perform a vital bodily func-
tion on its own. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at
372-373, 486 A.2d at 1236 (citations omit-
ted).7
The court also found support for the proposi-
tion that tube feeding is more akin to medical treat-
ment than ordinary care in Justice O'Connor's con-
currence in Cruzan: "Artificial feeding cannot
readily be distinguished from other forms of med-
ical treatment."38
The court then turned to the question of
whether the right to refuse "all unwanted life sus-
taining medical treatment" extends to incompetent
persons and concluded that it clearly did. "An
incompetent person does not relinquish the right to
refuse unwanted treatment by virtue of incompe-
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tency."" The guardian ad litem argued that
Wisconsin should adopt the stance of Missouri and
require proof of an individual's wishes by "clear
and convincing evidence." The court rejected this
suggestion, stating:
Relatively few individuals provide explicit written or
oral instructions concerning their treatment prefer-
ences should they become incompetent [footnote
omitted]. The reasons for this are undoubtedly myri-
ad: ignorance, superstition, carelessness, sloth, pro-
crastination or the simple refusal to believe it could
happen to oneself. This failure to act is not a decision
to accept all treatment, nor should society's increasing
ability to prolong the dying process make it one. To
adopt the clear and convincing standard would doom
many individuals to a prolonged vegetative state sus-
tained in a life form by unwanted, perhaps detrimen-
tal, means that are contrary to the person's best inter-
est. Moreover the legislature in the adoption of chs.
154 and 155, carefully pointed out that failure to exe-
cute a living will or power of attorney for health care
creates no presumption that the person consents to the
use or withholding of life-sustaining procedures.
Thus the stated legislative policy is to leave the deci-
sion, if not declared by the patient, to be determined
as a matter of common law-and the common law,
where the individual was never competent or where
the conduct of the individual while competent never
was of a kind from which one could draw a reason-
able inference upon which to make a substituted judg-
ment, requires that decision to be resolved by a surro-
gate decision maker acting in the best interests of the
incompetent.40
Having placed the decision on refusal of
unwanted medical treatment for incompetents in
the hands of a "surrogate decision maker," the
court then faced the question of whether the stan-
dard to be used by the decision maker in making the
end-of-life decision is to be the "best-interests" or
"substituted judgment" standard. The primary con-
cern of the court was that applying the substituted
judgment standard to L.W. was all but impossible
because that standard requires that the decision
maker know what the ward wanted. In the case of
L.W., it was impossible to know what he wanted,
since as the court found he was probably never
competent.4 1 Thus the court opted for a best-inter-
ests standard, while recognizing that if the incom-
petent person's wishes are known, it is in his or her
best interests to follow those wishes.4 2 The court
then reached its penultimate holding in this case:
In conclusion then we hold that a guardian may con-
sent to the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustain-
ing medical treatment on behalf of one who was never
competent, or a once competent person whose con-
duct never was of a kind from which one could draw
a reasonable inference upon which to make a substi-
tuted judgment, when:
(1) the incompetent patient's attending physi-
cian, together with two independent neurolo-
gists or physicians, determine with reasonable
medical certainty that the patient is in a per-
sistent vegetative state and has no reasonable
chance of recovery to a cognitive and sentient
life; [footnote omitted] and (2) the guardian
determines in good faith that the withholding
or withdrawal of treatment is in the ward's
best interests, according to the objective fac-
tors outlined below [footnote omitted] .
The court identified the following "objective
factors" to be considered by the guardian as fol-
lows:
The degree of humiliation, dependence, and loss of
dignity probably resulting from the condition and
treatment; the life expectancy and prognosis for recov-
ery with and without treatment; the various treatment
options; and the risks, side effects, and benefits of each
of those options."
In applying these factors the court cautioned
guardians to
Assess these factors from the standpoint of the patient,
and . . . not substitute his or her own view of the
"quality of life" of the ward. As the Rasmussen court
explained, the guardian's determination of what is in
the ward's best interests necessarily involves an assess-
ment of "the value that the continuation of life has for
the patient," but should not involve "the value that
others find in the continuation of the patient's life.
"45
The court also pointed out other considera-
tions, such as the view of the institution's ethics
committee and the views of relatives of the ward.46
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Finally, the court discussed the potential state
interests that must be considered in cases of this
type.
Courts have identified four relevant state interests: (1)
preserving life; (2) safeguarding the integrity of the
medical profession; (3) preventing suicide; and (4)
protecting innocent third parties.4 1
The court addressed each of these in turn and
concluded that none of them overcame the right of
the guardian for L.W. to assert his right to refuse
unwanted treatment. As a result of the L. W deci-
sion, Wisconsin guardians appeared to have the
right, without seeking court approval, to consent to
the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, includ-
ing artificial nutrition and hydration or tube feed-
ing, at least in the case of persons in a persistent
vegetative state.
Five years later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
revisited this issue in the Edna M.F. case." This
case, which appeared at first blush to have facts
only slightly different from L. W, came to a dra-
matically different result."
The ward in Edna M.P was described in the
majority opinion as follows:
Edna M.E is a 71-year-old woman who has been diag-
nosed with dementia of the Alzheimer's type. She is
bedridden, but her doctors have indicated that she
responds to stimulation from voice and movement.
She also appears alert at times, with her eyes open,
and she responds to mildly noxious stimuli. According
to these doctors, her condition does not meet the def-
inition of a persistent vegetative state. In 1988, a per-
manent feeding tube was surgically inserted in Edna's
body. Edna currently breathes without a respirator,
but she continues to receive artificial nutrition and
hydration. Edna's condition is not likely to improve.so
The other principal difference between Edna
M.E and L. W. is that Edna was an individual who,
prior to succumbing to Alzheimer's disease, was
described as a vibrant individual who would have
been competent to execute an advance medical
directive but did not do so." The court found that
the only statement she made regarding her wishes
as to life-sustaining treatment was a 30-year-old
statement to the effect that "I [Edna] would rather
die of cancer than lose my mind.""
Edna's niece requested that the tube feeding be
discontinued. The request was referred to the ethics
committee of the nursing home, which decided it
would permit the withdrawal of the tube feeding if
all family members agreed. One refused to do so in
writing on religious grounds and so the guardian
filed a petition with the Wood County Circuit
Court to approve withdrawal of the feeding tube.
The circuit court denied the petition and the case
was brought to the supreme court on a bypass pro-
cedure." The supreme court, in a majority opinion
by Justice Steinmetz, upheld the circuit court.
The court reviewed the Quinlan, Cruzan, and
L. W line of cases and concluded that incompetent
persons have the right, through their surrogate
decision makers, to refuse unwanted medical treat-
ment.54 However, relying on In re Guardianship of
Eberhardy," the court observed that while all per-
sons, whether competent or incompetent, have the
same constitutional rights, "the uninhibited exer-
cise of those rights may be hedged about with
restrictions that reflect the public policy of protect-
ing persons of a distinct class."56
The court then considered whether a guardian
of a person who is not in a persistent vegetative
state could consent to the withdrawal of tube feed-
ing. The court held that "if [a] person is not in a
persistent vegetative state, this court has deter-
mined that as a matter of law it is not in the best
interests of the ward to withdraw life sustaining
treatment, including a feeding tube, unless the
ward has executed an advance directive or other
statement clearly indicating his or her desires.""
The court explained its rationale for this "bright
line" test as follows:
One of the main reasons that this court in L.W. limited
the scope of its holdings is the fact that The American
Academy of Neurology explains that people in a persis-
tent vegetative state do not feel pain or discomfort.
L.W, 167 Wis. 2d at 87, note 17. In the case at bar,
Edna M.E is not in a persistent vegetative state and
could therefore likely feel the pain and discomfort of
starving to death. Even a competent person cannot
order "the withholding or withdrawal of any medica-
tion, life-sustaining procedure or feeding tube" if "the
withholding or withdrawal will cause the declarant pain
or reduce the declarant's comfort" unless the pain or
discomfort can be alleviated through further medical
means. Wis. Stat. 154.03(1). See also Wis. Stat.
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155.20(1). In the case where withdrawal of life-sustain-
ing medical treatment, including nutrition or hydration,
will cause pain or discomfort, then, the competent and
incompetent person have exactly the same rights."
The court then tried to bolster its position by
positing a "slippery slope" to euthanasia if the
position of the guardian for Edna were adopted." I
will suggest below that, given the criteria estab-
lished in L. W., there is no reasonable basis for the
slippery slope argument.
The court then discussed what the guardian
would have to show regarding Edna's wishes when
it came to end-of-life care.
Even though Edna M.F. is not currently existing in a
persistent vegetative state, if her guardian can demon-
strate by a preponderance of the evidence a clear state-
ment of Edna's desires in these circumstances, then it
is in the best interests of Edna to honor those wishes
[footnote omitted]. See L.W, 167 Wis. 2d at 79-80.
The reason this court requires a clear statement of the
ward's desires is because of the interest of the state in
preserving human life [footnote omitted] and the irre-
versible nature of the decision to withdraw nutrition
from a person.60
The court concluded that the evidence present-
ed regarding Edna's wishes was not sufficient to
overcome the state's presumed interest in maintain-
ing her biological life, and the relief sought by the
guardian was denied."1 There were several concur-
ring opinions expressing different views on how to
prove the existence of a persistent vegetative state,
but none differed with the underlying rationale of
the case, namely that a persistent vegetative state
was the appropriate "bright line."6 It is that under-
lying assumption that I question.
The Medical Issue
Ultimately, the decision in Edna M.F. turned on a
medical issue, namely whether Edna was in a per-
sistent vegetative state (PVS). But, I think it impor-
tant to look behind that question to what I believe
to be an even more important one: what was the
justification for establishing PVS as the "bright
line" test for deciding when a guardian could with-
draw artificial nutrition and hydration? This was
not an issue in L. W. because it was agreed that he
was in a persistent vegetative state. However, in
two footnotes, Chief Justice Heffernan set forth his
views at length:
Footnote 15 to the majority opinion in L. W.
stated:
We stress the unique status of individuals in a persis-
tent vegetative state, and the fact that this opinion is
strictly limited to persons in such a condition. As the
President's Commission concluded:
The primary basis for medical treatment of patients is
the prospect that each individual's interests (specifical-
ly, the interest in wellbeing) will be promoted. Thus,
treatment ordinarily aims to benefit a patient through
preserving life, relieving pain and suffering, protecting
against disability, and returning maximally effective
functioning. If a prognosis of permanent unconscious-
ness is correct, however, continued treatment cannot
confer such benefits. Pain and suffering are absent, as
are joy, satisfaction, and pleasure. Disability is total
and no return to an even minimal level of social or
human functioning is possible.'
At footnote 17, the court continues the discus-
sion:
The dissent urges that the incompetent patient must be
protected against the potential pain and discomfort
involved in the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and
hydration. Dissenting Op. at 96-99. However, this
concern is inapplicable to this case because individuals
in a persistent vegetative state cannot experience pain
or discomfort. The American Academy of Neurology
states:
Persistent vegetative state patients do not have the
capacity to experience pain or suffering. Pain and suf-
fering are attributes of consciousness requiring cere-
bral cortical functioning, and patients who are perma-
nently and completely unconscious cannot experience
these symptoms. There are several independent bases
for the neurological conclusion that persistent vegeta-
tive state patients do not experience pain or suffering.
First, direct clinical experience with these patients
demonstrates that there is no behavioral indication of
any awareness of pain or suffering. Second, in all per-
sistent vegetative state patients studied to date, post-
mortem examination reveals overwhelming bilateral
damage to the cerebral hemispheres to a degree incom-
patible with consciousness or the capacity to experi-
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ence pain or suffering. Third, recent data utilizing
positron emission tomography indicates that the meta-
bolic rate for glucose in the cerebral cortex is greatly
reduced in persistent vegetative state patients, to a
degree incompatible with consciousness.64
In the majority opinion in Edna M.E, Justice
Steinmetz restated the L. W. rationale:
One of the main reasons that this court in L.W. limit-
ed the scope of its holdings is the fact that The
American Academy of Neurology explains that people
in a persistent vegetative state do not feel pain or dis-
comfort. L.W. 167 Wis. 2d at 87, note 17. In the case
at bar, Edna M.F is not in a persistent vegetative state
and could therefore likely feel the pain and discomfort
of starving to death. Even a competent person cannot
order "the withholding or withdrawal of any medica-
tion, life-sustaining procedure or feeding tube" if "the
withholding or withdrawal will cause the declarant
pain or reduce the declarant's comfort" unless the pain
or discomfort can be alleviated through further med-
ical means. Wis. Stat. 154.03(1). See also Wis. Stat.
155.20(1). In the case where withdrawal of life-sus-
taining medical treatment, including nutrition or
hydration, will cause pain or discomfort, then, the
competent and incompetent person have exactly the
same rights."
The concurring opinions in Edna M.E all seem
to accept the basic rationale, namely that PVS is the
appropriate "bright line." They merely discuss how
PVS should be diagnosed. No one questions the
basic premise, namely that PVS is the appropriate
standard.
The underlying rationale of both L. W. and
Edna M.E can be stated as follows: (1) withdrawal
of nutrition and hydration causes pain; (2) pain is
to be avoided; (3) persons in PVS do not feel pain;
and therefore (4) it is only appropriate to withdraw
artificial nutrition and hydration for those who feel
no pain-namely those in the PVS condition.
What if this argument could be attacked at one
or more of its logical connections? What if, for
example, it were shown that the withdrawal of arti-
ficial nutrition or hydration did not cause pain but
in fact may ease pain? And, what if there are other
conditions where the patient does not feel pain?
What then is left of the basis for the conclusion,
begun in L. W. and continued in Edna M.R, that
PVS is the only condition where withdrawal of
nutrition and hydration is permissible? As the fol-
lowing discussion will show, there is a considerable
body of medical authority for the proposition that
the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration
in dying patients may relieve rather than cause pain
and discomfort. In light of that authority, I submit
that the decision in Edna M.P should be reexam-
ined and that guardians of incompetent individuals
should have broader authority to make end-of-life
decisions for their wards.
The Medical Literature
A review of the medical literature on the topic of
the effects of dehydration on terminally ill patients
has led me to conclude that it is more likely than
not that the pain and suffering referred to by
Justice Steinmetz in the Edna M.E opinion" does
not occur. The nature of the problem is stated as
follows:
The general impression among hospice clinician (sic) is
that starvation and dehydration do not contribute to
suffering among the dying and might actually con-
tribute to a comfortable passage from life. In contrast,
the general impression among the public and non-hos-
pice medical professionals is that starvation and dehy-
dration are terrible ways to die. Scientific support for
either viewpoint has been scanty, and yet modern
medical practice has reflected an aversion to allowing
a person to starve to death.6 7
As many commentators point out, the issue is
often the "symbolism" that is associated with pro-
viding food and fluids to dying persons. It is
thought that this is "ordinary care" and the least
that one can do for a dying person. However, as
one commentator pointed out,
Although tube feeding has been likened to the provi-
sion of food and water [footnotes omitted], it does
not resemble eating or drinking in any way except for
its symbolism . . . . In addition to these problems
[arising from tube feeding], there are less obvious
ones. Tube feeding is a passive process that bypasses
the sensory input of the patient. . . . A feeding tube
may produce anxiety or fear in the confused patient
who has some awareness. These patients may not
understand the purpose of the tube and may attempt
to dislodge it. . . . Tube feeding, in general, is devoid
of the interpersonal aspects of ordinary feeding,
which in itself can be a comforting encounter; tube
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feeding also lacks the sensory qualities of real food
and drink, which might provide the patient with a
modicum of pleasure."
Of course, for many of the patients we are con-
sidering, oral ingestion of food and water is not a
possibility. Even if they are not in a persistent veg-
etative state, they may be in another condition that
similarly renders them unable to eat or drink."9 In
fact, in the Cruzan case, the Supreme Court agreed
that the provision of artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion constituted medical care rather than ordinary
care for the patient."
However, the issue posed by the court in Edna
M.. was not whether the provision of artificial
nutrition and hydration was ordinary care, but
rather whether the withdrawal of such nutrition
and hydration caused pain and suffering. The con-
clusion of a number of commentators, based both
on general observations in the clinic and specific
studies, is that such withdrawal does not cause
pain and in fact might actually enhance the comfort
of the dying patient. A monograph containing case
studies of three terminally ill patients in 1993 con-
cluded that "there are benefits to dehydration and
detriments to hydration in this population." In
each case reported, there was an increase in alert-
ness and apparent comfort when artificial nutrition
and hydration were discontinued.7' The article sug-
gested the reason for this phenomenon is that
[i]n patients in advanced stages of dehydration,
enhanced comfort may be due to the release of pain
relieving substances. . .. Another possible explanation
for the absence of symptoms is that ketones produced
during starvation have an anesthetic effect which has
been shown in the squid axon.
Another study, reported in the Journal of the
American Medical Association in 1994, monitored
32 "mentally competent terminally ill patients" in
a nursing home. The conclusion of the study was
summarized as follows:
In this series, patients terminally ill with cancer gener-
ally did not experience hunger and those who did
needed only small amounts of food for alleviation.
Complaints of thirst and dry mouth were relieved with
mouth care and sips of liquids far less than that need-
ed to prevent dehydration. Food and fluid administra-
tion beyond the specific requests of patients may play
a minimal role in providing comfort to terminally ill
patients."
In this study, the investigators found that termi-
nal patients from whom food was withdrawn expe-
rienced comfort despite the withdrawal of food.
This was attributed to the increased fat metabolism
and production of ketone, which served as an ener-
gy source for peripheral tissues and the central ner-
vous system. They concluded that
In patients with advanced cancer and malnutrition,
there has been no consistent benefit of aggressive
nutritional support on morbidity or mortality nor has
there by consistent reversal of the metabolic abnor-
malities that occur in these states. . . . Studies of vol-
untary fasting demonstrate that subjects become not
only anorectic but are also comfortable. . . .The major
symptom noted in our subjects and in another study of
severe dehydration however was that of thirst and/or
dry mouth (these could not be differentiated in our
patients). The symptoms were completely relieved
with ice chips, sips of liquid, lip moisteners, hard
candy and mouth care. The lack of fluid intake also
generally produced the positive effects of decreased
secretions, as evidenced by few episodes of prolonged
choking and infrequent need for suctioning in our
patients.7 4
The author of this article also observed:
In caring for terminally ill or chronically ill patients,
tube feedings are often initiated to alleviate the anxi-
ety of caregivers and families of patients. . . .
Caregivers, patients, and families need to be educated
that loss of a normal appetite is commonly observed in
dying patients and does not substantially contribute to
their suffering.7'
A 1995 article reviewed much of the then-cur-
rent literature on the topic of dehydration of ter-
minally ill patients and came to a similar conclu-
sion. 6 This study noted a decided split of opinion
with respect to rehydration of the terminally ill
between doctors practicing in a hospital setting
and those in a hospice. The article cited one study
that showed that 40 percent of doctors in a hospi-
tal setting reported that they would use artificial
hydration for a comatose patient with "wide-
9
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spread malignancy" whereas none of the hospice
physicians would do so. The authors suggested
that a benefits/burden analysis is appropriate in
this situation:
However, it may be that the issue we need to address
is our assessment of likely benefit, rather than
attempting to quantify medical intrusion. Our respon-
sibility here is not to take a stance on the appropriate-
ness of artificial rehydration, but to make individual
unprejudiced clinical assessments in the light of the
patient's (or their representative's) own preferences for
treatment and our knowledge of the evidence con-
cerning that treatment. In the uncomplicated deterio-
ration from end-stage metastatic malignancy, in which
the patient becomes unable to take oral fluids, there is
no evidence that artificial hydration will provide any
benefit... . Doctors need to be careful that a decision
to prolong life temporarily in the terminal phase is an
objective one in the interests of the patient, rather than
a means of minimizing their own feelings of responsi-
bility and even guilt."7
This review of the medical literature leads to the
conclusion that the withdrawal of tube feeding and
hydration does not, as asserted by the majority in
Edna M.P, cause pain and suffering. If this is the
case, then the "bright line" test asserted in Edna
M.E (and drawn from the prior L. W. case) does
not hold up in light of the apparent medical facts.
In fact, it appears from this literature that the pro-
vision of artificial nutrition and hydration may be
causing the very pain and suffering that the court is
trying to avoid.78 For this reason, I submit that the
approach adopted by the court in Edna M.E does
not lead to an appropriate resolution of the dilem-
ma faced by guardians of incompetent individuals
who are in conditions where withholding or with-
drawal of artificial nutrition and hydration is med-
ically indicated.
Decisions in Other States
In addition to reviewing the Wisconsin cases on
this topic, I also looked at cases in nine other states
that were decided after Cruzan." While there were
a number of other decisions, these seemed to pre-
sent a representative sample of the decisions that
followed Cruzan." To analyze these cases, I have
identified a number of key issues and compared
how other states dealt with the problem in contrast
to Wisconsin. I have included a table in the appen-
dix to this article that summarizes my findings.
Again, this will not be an in-depth analysis, but it
will attempt to provide an overview of what is
going on.
Persistent Vegetative State
In both L.W. and Edna M.E, the wards were in a
persistent vegetative state. In Edna M.E the exis-
tence of this condition was deemed the critical
problem in the case. In five of the cases reviewed,
the ward was also in a persistent vegetative state. In
three of the cases, the ward was not. One of the
cases does not explicitly state the medical condi-
tion. All of the wards in these cases were severely
incapacitated. There is no real correlation between
the existence of PVS and the outcome of the case.
In only three of the cases is there any discussion of
PVS and then only to assert that persons in that
condition do not feel pain. This is done to counter-
act arguments regarding pain from withdrawal of
hydration and nutrition.
Advance Directives
In both of the Wisconsin cases, there were no
advance medical directives. Not surprisingly, that
was also the case in all but one of the nine other
cases reviewed. In the one case where there was an
advance directive, there was an issue of whether it
was in effect since there was a factual question as
to whether the ward's condition was terminal. I say
this is not surprising because where there is an
advance medical directive, the guardianship court
should not get involved.
Source of Right to Refuse Treatment
The Wisconsin cases based the right to refuse treat-
ment both on the common-law notion of informed
consent and on the U.S. and Wisconsin Constitu-
tions. In contrast, six of the nine jurisdictions
reviewed based the right of refusal strictly on the
common-law right of informed consent and most
explicitly refused to reach the constitutional issue.
Two of the courts relied on constitutional grounds,
typically the right to privacy, and one court based
the right on public policy as announced by the leg-
islature. It is interesting that all of the courts found
that there was a right to refuse treatment. The big
issue was how that right is to be implemented in
the case of an incompetent patient.
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Standard for Decision
The Wisconsin cases adopted a best-interests test to
guide the guardian in making his or her decision.
These cases then discussed the criteria to be used by
the guardians to make their decisions. In seven of
the nine other decisions reviewed, the courts applied
some variant of the substituted judgment standard.
They felt that the most important inquiry was what
the ward said he or she would want with respect to
end-of-life care and directed that the guardian must
do his or her best to ascertain what that intent was.
The intent could be expressed orally or in writing
and could sometimes be inferred from other facts of
the individual's life. These courts rejected the best-
interests test out of a fear that it would impose
someone else's ideas as to quality of life. In only one
of the cases was the best-interests standard adopted,
and in one of the cases the standard was not dis-
cussed. Note that in Edna M.E, for persons not in a
persistent vegetative state, the inquiry as to the pre-
viously expressed wishes of the ward does not differ
markedly from the substituted judgment adopted by
the other courts.
Standard of Proof
The Wisconsin Supreme Court explicitly rejected
the clear-and-convincing standard approved by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Cruzan, opting instead for a
preponderance-of-the-evidence test. This is clearly
against the trend disclosed in the nine cases
reviewed. Six of the nine cases adopted a clear-and-
convincing evidence test, while one adopted a pre-
ponderance-of-the-evidence approach. In two of
the cases it was not possible from the opinion to
ascertain what evidentiary standard was applied.
Given the fact that most of these courts were look-
ing to the intent of the ward as to end-of-life deci-
sions, it is not surprising that a high level of proof
would be required.
The Outcomes
Given the foregoing discussion, one might assume
that the courts would be hostile to the withdrawal
of artificial nutrition and hydration, given the sub-
stantial hurdles established for the guardians. Yet
in six of the nine cases reviewed (not counting the
Wisconsin cases that split evenly) in the final analy-
sis, the courts permitted the withdrawal of artificial
nutrition and hydration. Even though the proce-
dural and substantive barriers have been high, in
the end the courts have appeared sympathetic to
the individual situations of the wards as they
applied their standards. In one of the cases in
which an individual was found not to be in a PVS,
the court refused to allow withdrawal of tube feed-
ing. Yet, in two other cases where PVS was not
shown, the court nonetheless allowed tube feeding
to be withdrawn.
Conclusion
What may we conclude from this brief review of
other cases? First, concerning a number of ques-
tions, Wisconsin's position differs from the norm in
other states. Second, as a general rule the other
courts, like the court in Edna M.E, seek to place
high barriers to exercise of the right to refuse treat-
ment when that treatment is artificial nutrition and
hydration, even though all of the courts agree that
such provision is medical treatment rather than
ordinary care. However, notwithstanding such bar-
riers, the courts remain sympathetic to the plight of
seriously incapacitated individuals and find ways
to permit the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and
hydration.
A Suggested Resolution
Just as in the Wizard of Oz, where the solution to
Dorothy's problem of how to return to Kansas was
always at her feet, so too I believe the solution to
the problem of withdrawal of artificial nutrition
and hydration has been presented to us by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in the L. W. case. L. W.,
when you take away the unfortunate language
relating to persistent vegetative state, provides a
workable framework for resolving the tube-feeding
question. As we recall, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held in L. W. that where an incompetent per-
son's own wishes could not be identified, the
guardian should apply a "best-interests" test based
on objective factors:
In making the best interests determination, the
guardian must begin with a presumption that contin-
ued life is in the best interests of the ward. Whether
that presumption may be overcome depends upon a
good faith assessment by the guardian of several
objective factors.




[Tihe degree of humiliation, dependence, and loss of
dignity probably resulting from the condition and
treatment; the life expectancy and prognosis for recov-
ery with and without treatment; the various treatment
options; and the risks, side effects, and benefits of each
of those options."
This analysis is similar to the "benefits/bur-
dens" analysis used by medical ethicists:
Doctors are both morally and legally justified in with-
holding or withdrawing any treatments that are not
beneficial to their patients. Given that the patient is
certainly dying, the ethical imperative remains that of
imposing no greater burden than benefit on the patient
(i.e., optimum symptomatic management) rather than
attempts to postpone the point of death.8 2
By adopting such an approach, the guardian
who is making a decision regarding tube feeding
for an incompetent patient, and the patient's doc-
tor, are placed in the same position as if the patient
were competent. The doctor can make the same
benefits/burdens analysis he or she would make in
the case of any other patient and make an informed
medical decision based on that analysis. The
guardian can weigh the various "objective factors"
noted above, as well as the guardian's personal
knowledge of the views and values of the ward,
and make an informed judgment that should be in
the ward's best interests.
It seems to me that this approach avoids many
of the problems created by the substituted judg-
ment test applied in the other states. Under substi-
tuted judgment, there can be a long, involved, and
frankly often tortured analysis of the desires of the
incompetent person when, in all likelihood, he or
she may never have really considered or discussed
the issue with any particular insight. Thus, the
search for the intent of the individual will often be
quite futile or facile. This tends to render the pre-
sumed basis for this test, carrying out the ward's
wishes, ineffectual.
The L. W. approach (without PVS) also
responds to Justice Steinmetz' "slippery slope"
argument in Edna M.E The L. W. factors provide a
reasonable framework for end-of-life decision
making by guardians. They would not sanction
euthanasia for its own sake. Rather, a careful
analysis of the circumstances of the patient and the
benefits and burdens of the continuation of artifi-
cial nutrition and hydration to the patient would
be the paramount considerations. Will mistakes be
made and decisions made for improper reasons?
Perhaps. But the fact that the individual is or is not
in a persistent vegetative state will not change the
possibility and consequences of a wrong decision.
And I maintain that it is more likely that a correct
decision (one in the best interests of the ward and
probably closer to what the ward would have
wanted in most cases) will be made under the
analysis in L. W. (free of the PVS restriction) as
opposed to the Edna M.E analysis.
Conclusion
In the final analysis, the thesis of this article is that
the Edna M.E decision should be revisited in a case
where the scientific and medical basis for its con-
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clusions can be reexamined in light of modern
experience, especially in the hospice setting. The
current position of the court often creates an unten-
able situation for families and their advisors since
there is often more flexibility in end-of-life decision
making where there is no guardian (even in the
absence of an advance directive) than where a
guardian has been appointed. In addition, the fact
that feeding tubes, once installed, might not be able
to be removed could lead to unintended conse-
quences. For example, doctors and families might
be more reluctant to start the feeding tube when it
could possibly do some good, out of the fear that if
things do not work out as planned, the ward and
his or her family might be condemned to a pro-
longed dying process. Providing more flexibility to
guardians can avoid these problems without jeop-
ardizing other significant community interests. It is
time to take another look.
11. Id. at 657.
12. Id. at 651-58.
13. See 355 A.2d at 664. The court rejected Mr.
Quinlan's claim of a parental right to privacy
under these circumstances.
14. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
15. 355 A.2d at 664 (emphasis added).
16. See id.
17. What happened next is of some interest. After the
respirator was disconnected, Karen continued
breathing on her own, was moved to a nursing
home, and continued to live for several years,
albeit being subject to tube feeding.
18. See generally 355 A.2d at 647.
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